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I. INTRODUCTION 
The current American liability system can best be described with the 
following analogy: 
Think of the liability system as a poker game. Each person, 
corporation, or other entity in the economy is a player. Players 
risk their chips, that is their wealth, by tossing them into the pot, 
that is, investing them in liability-generating economic activity. 
Chips contributed to the pot are at risk of loss; the system can 
take them to satisfy liability. Chips withheld are not at risk. 
This poker game has an odd twist to it. Withholding chips 
does not reduce significantly the amounts players can win or play-
ers' likelihood of winning. Even players who don't put any chips 
in the pot-that is, players who are judgment proof-can keep 
playing the game and are eligible to win. Why do players put 
chips in the pot? No rules require them to do so. 2 
As Professor Lopucki aptly explains in the above analogy, no player 
is required to ante up any assets to continue to play the high stakes game 
of liability poker. 3 The ability of people to remove their chips from the 
* Copyright © 1998 by Ritchie W. Taylor. The author would like to thank R. Christopher 
Hunter. principal of the Hunter Law Firm in Chapel Hill, NC, for introducing the author to and 
tutoring him in the topic of asset protection. This article is dedicated to Robert W. and Mary R. 
Taylor, the author's parents, without whose support the author would never have made it through 
law school. 
I. Lynn Asinof, Protection of Off~hore Trusts Comes Onshore in Two States, WALL ST 
1., July 23, 1997, at Cl (statement made by Gideon Rothschild, a New York Attorney). 
2. Lynn M. Lopucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L. J. I, 3 (1996). Professor 
Lopucki's article on judgment proofing strategies provides a detailed discussion of clomcstrc 
liability limiting strategies available to corporations, which is beyond the scope of this article, but 
the poker analogy aptly applies to personal asset protection as well. 
3. The stakes have risen over the past 20 years. Between 1976-1986, the number of 
personal injury cases in federal court rose by 600% and the size of the average jury verdict tripled 
over that time period to $1 million. See generally Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation 
Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (Fall 1986). 
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table and continue to play, through use of asset protection, has helped 
fuel the phenomenal growth of offshore financial centers over the past 30 
years. Today, an estimated one-half of the world's money supply passes 
yearly through offshore financial centers.4 This accounts for more than $5 
trillion annually.5 
The multi-faceted growth of these centers has been fueled by a desire 
to obtain regulatory relief from burdensome United States governmental 
regulation, protect financial privacy, provide international investment 
opportunities, and, most recently, by a desire to achieve asset protection. 
People have resorted to anticipatory measures to protect their possessory 
property interests through use of asset protection techniques. Asset pro-
tection allows clients to locate their assets in jurisdictions where the rules 
of litigation are more friendly to property owners. These jurisdictions are 
quite different from the plaintiff friendly court structure present in the 
United States. Many attorneys and clients consider asset protection to be 
leveling the judicial playing field, allowing both defendants and plaintiffs 
to enjoy "fair play"6 in litigation. 
Currently, asset protection trusts are the most popular method of us-
ing offshore financial centers to achieve asset protection. It is estimated 
that over $1 trillion of foreign trust funds are in asset protection trusts. 7 
Offshore asset protection trusts are self-settled trusts established in for-
eign jurisdictions that recognize these trusts as entities separate from the 
grantor. Asset protection trusts arrived to fill the void left in the wake of 
judges allowing juries to pierce traditional liability limiting entities, such 
as corporations, limited liability partnerships, and limited liability compa-
nies, to satisfy judgments.8 
In addition to statutory protections afforded offshore asset protection 
trusts, offshore financial centers provide a beneficial choice of law situs 
for such trusts. Traditionally, asset protection trusts have been viewed as 
tax neutral, although this has been somewhat debated.9 
4. See David D. Beazer, The Mystique of "Going Offshore," 9 UTAH BAR J. 19 (Dec. 
1996). 
5. See id. 
6. Jonathan L. Mezrich, It's Better in the Bahamas: Asset Protection Trusts for lhe 
Pennsylvania Lawyer, 98 DICK. L. REV. 657, 675 (1994); Gideon Rothschild, Establishing and 
Drafting Offshore Asset Protection Trusts, 23 EST. PLAN. 65, 65-66 (Feb. 1996). 
7. See Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Having Your Cake and 
Eating It Too, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. II, 14 (1994). 
8. See Rothschild, supra note 7, at 65. 
9. See Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Are they Tax Neutral? 7 J. 
lNT'L TAX'N 107 (March 1996); Marty-Nelson, Taxing Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Icing on 
the Cake? 15 VA. TAX REV. 399 (1996) (discussing why offshore asset protection trusts may not 
be tax neutral). See also Howard D. Rosen & Patricia A. Donlevy-Rosen, Internal Revenue Service 
Targets Abusive Trust Arrangements, 2 J. OF ASSET PROTECT. 6 (July/Aug. 1997) (discussing the 
various attempts to achieve favorable tax treatment of offshore trusts in ways not grounded in law). 
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Despite the favorable advantages of asset protection trusts, until 
April, 1997, domestic asset protection trusts were not a viable option for 
Americans. However, in April, 1997, Alaska became the first state to stat-
utorily permit asset protection trusts. 10 In July, Delaware followed suit. 11 
Now asset protection practitioners must consider how, if at all, domestic 
asset protection trusts can play a part in a client's asset protection system. 
This comment weighs the benefits unique to both domestic and off-
shore asset protection trusts. Part III compares the choice of procedural 
and statutory law-including fraudulent conveyance law-available in 
both Delaware and Alaska, with such law in offshore financial centers. 
Part IV discusses the considerations in selecting a trust situs and the like-
lihood of attachment of trust assets to fulfill a judgment granted to a po-
tential future creditor of the grantor. Part V discusses the possible federal 
income, estate, and gift tax consequences under both domestic and off-
shore asset protection trusts. Part VI contains an evaluation and conclu-
sion, based on the foregoing analysis, of when domestic asset protection 
trusts may be a viable option for a client and when such trusts may fail to 
serve a client's interest. The conclusion will highlight when a domestic 
asset protection trust may provide the best answer for a client and when it 
acts as a charlatan. In other words, once you scratch off the gold cover-
ing, do domestic asset protection trusts provide equal protection to clients 
or are they simply cheap imitations or charlatans of offshore trusts? 
II. BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO ASSET PROTECTION 
Traditional methods of asset protection include the use of corpora-
tions, limited liability partnerships, and, most recently, limited liability 
companies. These traditional models have been remolded in recent years 
to include family limited partnerships. Such traditional business struc-
tures have suffered several setbacks as more ends-minded judges and 
sympathetic juries have looked beyond legal details and have pierced 
through these entities in their search for funds to satisfy judgments 
against businesses. Traditional methods for shielding personal assets have 
included transferring the personal assets into family limited partnerships 
or to the lower liability spouse. Transfers to spouses no longer remain a 
viable option for most Americans due to America's extraordinary divorce 
rate12 and to the unwillingness of most spouses to relinquish all legal con-
trol and ownership of assets to their spouses or children. 
10. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (Michie 1997). 
II. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3572-73 (1997). 
12. See Mezrich, supra note 7, at 658. 
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The current asset protection industry is the response to the failure of 
these traditional methods. 13 The asset protection industry is a natural ap-
pendage of the estate and tax planning industry. Asset protection attor-
neys assist clients in completing an asset protection plan. The plan in-
cludes three parts: estate planning, tax minimization strategies, and judg-
ment creditor planning.14 Indeed, with today' s continuing litigation explo-
sion, asset protection may not only be a necessity for high net worth cli-
ents, but the estate planner may have an ethical duty to assist clients in 
either developing asset protection plans or referring them to those who 
specialize in the field. 15 
Clients who make the voyage offshore may realize numerous advan-
tages in addition to asset protection. These advantages may include tax 
planning, international estate planning, global investing and banking, pro-
tection of privacy, facilitation of international business transactions, re-
lief from regulatory burdens, reinsurance, shipping, and expatriation plan-
ning.16 
One popular asset protection device, the offshore asset protection 
trust, is an irrevocable trust, typically established for a term of years with 
a reversionary interest in the grantor. 17 The trustee typically has unfet-
tered discretion over how, if at all, trust income will be distributed. 18 
However, trustees are typically governed by either a letter of intent pre-
pared by the grantor or by a protector. A protector can be either one indi-
vidual or a committee of advisors. Having a protector allows the grantor 
to retain some control over the trustee by making the trustee serve at the 
pleasure of the grantor's trusted ally who is either the protector or chair-
person of the committee. 19 
Asset protection trusts offer several advantages unavailable to clients 
through traditional domestic means. Offshore clients have enhanced abil-
ity to retain both beneficial use of and effective control of their assets. 
Also, many of these offshore jurisdictions have incorporated other statu-
13. See Richard S. Amari, Asset Protection Trusts: Nuclear Bomb Shelter, 66 FLA. B. J. 
17 (July/Aug. 1992); supra note 4. 
14. See generally Barry S. Engel, Using Foreign Situs Trusts for Asset Protection Planning, 
20 EST. PLAN. 212 (July/Aug. 1993). 
15. See R. Christopher Hunter, An Impassioned Argument for Offshore Advocacy as an 
Ethical Duty, 3 J. Asset Protect. No. 2 pg. 48 (Nov./Dec. 1997) (Mr. Hunter is the leading 
proponent of the belief that an attorney must consider a limiting a client's lawsuit exposure in 
order to be a zealous advocate); Peter Spero, How to Arrange a Client's Property for Asset 
Protection, 22 EST. PLAN. 226 (1995) (maintaining that attorneys may now have a duty to raise 
the issue of asset protection with clients). See also MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 
1.1 cmt. 2 (1995). 
16. See Beazer, supra note 5, at 19. 
17. See Nelson, supra note 8, at 12-13. 
18. See Nelson, supra note 8, at 12-13. 
19. See Nelson, supra note 8, at 12-13. 
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tory changes in traditional trust law, such as revoking the rule against per-
petuities.20 Furthermore, by locating their assets offshore, their assets are 
not automatic targets for plaintiffs' attorneys hungry for a favorable judg-
ment.Z1 Another advantage is that foreign trusts create practical barriers to 
potential creditors. Lastly, offshore jurisdictions often provide greater 
protection to traditional liability limiting entities.22 
All of these protections do not come without significant potential 
risks and expenses that clients must consider when deciding whether to 
take assets offshore. The first consideration is possible political instabil-
ity in the nation where the assets are deposited.23 This risk may in reality 
be minimal, but for Americans accustomed to federally insured banks and 
brokerages, the political and economic instability they may encounter 
offshore may be a significant enough risk that they would prefer to leave 
their assets in the United States. There are two important safeguards in 
most offshore trusts that minimize these risks. First, most trust documents 
contain a flight clause, which enables the trustee to remove the trust to 
another country if he feels the home situs is a risky location for the 
trust.24 The second safeguard is that once the assets are moved into the 
trust, they are usually and immediately reinvested in the United States?5 
The major reason these trusts were unavailable in the United States 
until 1997 was the fundamental American rule against recognizing self-
settled trusts with spendthrift protection. Allowing a person to use spend-
thrift trusts to inhibit a creditor from attaching assets formally owned by 
the grantor, who is now a beneficiary, was traditionally deemed to be 
against public policy. The reporter for the Restatement on Trusts sup-
ported that belief when he wrote, "it is well settled that where a person 
creates for his own benefit a trust with a provision restraining the volun-
tary or involuntary transfer of his interest, his transferee or creditor can 
reach his interest."26 The black letter law has been that state and federal 
courts refuse to enforce spendthrift provisions in self-settled trusts.Z7 This 
20. Five other American states have done likewise: Alaska, Delaware, Idaho, South Dakota, 
and Wisconsin. See infra note 114, at 357. 
21. See MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCf Rule 1.6(a) (1995) (stating that the duty 
of confidentiality helps protect client's transfer from being discovered). 
22. See Engel, supra note 15, at 214. 
23. See. e.g., Serge F. Kovaleski, Organized Crime Exercises Clout in Island Nations, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1998, at AI (pointing out the increasing power of drug dealers to influence 
and corrupt Carribean Island governments). 
24. See Nelson, supra note 8, at 66. 
25. See Nelson, supra note 8, at 67. 
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ I 56 reporter's notes (1957). 
27. See Nelson, supra note 8, at 29-30. Some states have statutory prohibitions against self-
settled spendthrift trusts. See generally CA. PRO. CODE. § 15304 (West 1991 ); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 53-12-28(c) (Supp. 1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-3-2 (West 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 33-101 
(1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2004(2) (West Supp. 1994); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 5205(c) 
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policy only applies to self-settled spendthrift trusts because courts have 
long recognized the right of a grantor, as absolute owner of his assets, to 
vest them in whomever he wishes and have that right protected from po-
tential creditors of the beneficiary_28 
Courts have traditionally considered trusts self-settled if one of sev-
eral factors is present.29 These factors consider whether the settlor is a 
beneficiary of the trust, retains dominion or control over the trust corpus, 
retains and reserves a general power of appointment in himself, or the 
trust was created for the settlor's own support.30 If any of these factors 
are present, courts will usually find such trusts to be self-settled. Courts 
have rejected the form over substance arguments to impute the assets to 
the grantor-beneficiary when the trust corpus comes from the beneficiary, 
even though, on paper, the trust was created by a third person. 31 
Despite the common law rule against self-settled spendthrift trusts, 
some courts have upheld them. In Herzog v. Commissioner, the discre-
tionary features of Herzog's trust were allowed to block creditors because 
Herzog was not the only income beneficiary of the trust. 32 Likewise, all 
but two states currently preclude tort victim creditors from satisfying 
judgments from support payments or assets contained in a traditional 
spendthrift trust.33 This extension of spendthrift protection has already 
occurred in other self-settled trusts, such as ERISA plans,34 custodial ac-
counts, annuities, and insurance contracts.35 Alaska and Delaware are at-
tempting to continue this movement towards extending spendthrift pro-
tection to all properly established self-settled trusts. 
(West Supp. 1993); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.035(d) (West 1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19(c) 
(Michie Supp. 1994). 
28. See Broadway Nat'l Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 173 (1882); Nelson. supra note 
8, at 20. 
29. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156(2) (1959); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
PROPERTY § 13.3 and cmt. a (1986). 
30. See Nelson, supra note 8, at 31-33. 
31. See Nelson. supra note 8, at 31-33. 
32. See Herzog v. Comm'r, 116 F.2d 591, 594 (2"" Cir. 1941). 
33. The two states not allowing for this protection are Georgia and Louisiana. See LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 9:2005(3) (West 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-28(c) (Michie 1997). 
34. See Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992) (upholding the anti-alienation clause in 
ERISA plans). 
35. See Eli R. Mattioli et al., Creditor's Rights Regarding Trusts, 202 PRACTICING LAW 
INSTITUTE/ESTATE PLANNING HANDBOOK 273, 276 (1991). 
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ill. PROCEDURAL AND STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS IN DOMESTIC AND 
OFFSHORE ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS 
In determining whether an offshore or domestic asset protection trust 
is the most beneficial option for a client, an attorney must evaluate both 
the procedural and statutory protections available to clients in both do-
mestic and offshore jurisdictions. 
A. Procedural Law Considerations 
Several procedural advantages are available to clients who locate 
their assets in offshore jurisdictions. Often these procedural safeguards 
provide the primary incentive to locating assets offshore. This section 
will consider each of the primary procedural motivations and its weight in 
a client's asset protection calculus. 
1. No Statute of Elizabeth 
One of the primary procedural reasons assets are able to be seized in 
the United States is the Statute of Elizabeth. The Statute of Elizabeth, 
requiring fraudulent conveyances to be set aside, entered the English le-
gal tradition in 1571.36 All states in the United States have either retained 
the common law codified in the Statute of Elizabeth or have enacted a 
counterpart in either the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance or Fraudulent 
Transfer Acts.37 Most offshore financial centers have repealed the Statute 
of Elizabeth and replaced it with weaker fraudulent conveyance stan-
dards, making these centers more attractive for offshore asset protection 
trusts. 38 This comment later reviews in more detail Alaska's and Dela-
ware's fraudulent conveyance laws and how they apply to asset protec-
tion trusts sited in those states. 
2. Short Statute of Limitations 
One way fraudulent conveyance standards are weakened in offshore 
jurisdictions is through implementing shorter statutes of limitations for 
determining if a conveyance is fraudulent. Most common law jurisdic-
tions have a statutory time period in which any conveyance can be un-
done in order to satisfy a judgment. The range for statutes of limitations 
for offshore jurisdictions varies from presuming no assets in the trust are 
36. 13 Elizabeth I Ch. 5 (1571 ). 
37. See Sandra E. Mayerson et al., Four Centuries of Fraudulent Conveyance Law in Forty 
Minutes: Its Continuing Development and Application, 652 PLI/COMM 31, 33-34 (1993). These 
acts will be discussed in more detail in Part III B. 
38. Engle, supra note IS, at 215-16. 
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fraudulently placed there39 to a statute of limitation of two years. 40 With-
out exception, offshore jurisdictions will not allow, as a matter of law, an 
action to set aside a conveyance as fraudulent if the transaction between 
the creditor and debtor occurred after the funds were transferred into the 
trust. 41 
Alaska amended its fraudulent conveyance law to require that the 
creditor prove both that the creditor was a pre-existing creditor and either 
that the "transfer was intended in whole or in part to hinder, delay, or de-
fraud creditors or other persons" or that the trust is revocable by the 
settlor.42 Pre-existing creditors of the settlor are given four years from the 
transfer to make a claim on the assets or one year after the "transfer is or 
reasonably could have been discoverable by the person."43 It appears that 
the discovery rule would take precedent over the four year rule. Although 
Alaska's asset protection trust protections are less generous than many 
offshore jurisdictions, these protections are fair to both creditors and 
debtors and allow for a reasonable time for discovery of the trust and to 
file a writ of attachment against any assets. 
Delaware's statute of limitations is substantially more liberal. Section 
3572 of the Delaware code is substantially the same legislation as 
Alaska's, but section 3573 of the same code makes several key excep-
tions. These exceptions allow for the trust to be pierced to pay child sup-
port, alimony, and any creditor who relied on a written statement of the 
transferor that the property was available to satisfy the debt.44 These 
groups are already pre-existing creditors; therefore, this section was an 
unnecessary addition to section 3572, which may act as a door to allow 
judges to use their "equity" powers to pierce any trust they feel is unjust. 
Delaware severely limited the protection offered in its statute and hope-
fully will reconsider section 3573. 
3. No Contingency Fees 
Another procedural barrier to protecting assets in the United States 
has been the availability of contingency fees. Despite the traditional com-
39. See Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance 1990 42A (Gibraltar). This act provides that 
if a settlor is an individual and is not insolvent on the day of a registered transfer, then no 
settlor--existing or subsequent-can set aside the transfer. The exception to this rule is for 
contingent liabilities of which the settlor had actual knowledge. 
40. See Bahamas Fraudulent Dispositions Act, 1991 4; International Trust Act 1984 13B 
(Cook Islands); Nevis International Exempt Trust Ordinance 1994 24(3). 
41. See Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992); Mattioli, supra note 36. 
42. ALASKA STAT.§ 34.40.110(a)(l) (Michie 1997). 
43. !d. at § 34.40.IIO(d)(l). 
44. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12 § 3572-73 (1997). 
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moo law preclusion of contingency fees,45 the United States is one of 
three countries that has accepted contingency fee arrangements as valid.46 
Even if the plaintiff's bar is correct that these arrangements open the 
doors of justice to those who would otherwise be barred from bringing 
"meritorious" actions, contingency fees also encourage attorneys to take 
cases the attorney believes can extract a settlement, regardless of the mer-
its of the case. Offshore jurisdictions prohibit contingency fee arrange-
ments, making marginal or nuisance claims more risky and assisting the 
debtor in leveling the playing field. Alaska and Delaware continue to al-
low contingency fee arrangements, thereby reducing the attractiveness for 
asset protection trusts in those jurisdictions. 
4. Statutory Bank Secrecy 
Another key procedural protection many individuals seek offshore is 
bank secrecy. In this information age, a person's personal financial affairs 
can be pierced by credit bureaus and telemarketing agencies, all using a 
personal skeleton key-the person's social security number.47 Americans 
typically think of bank secrecy as originating in Switzerland,48 but this is 
not completely accurate. Under the English common law, all bankers had 
a duty not to divulge bank clients' financial records.49 
In order to track financial transactions involving illegal activity, 
Americans sacrificed this traditional confidentiality right with the pas-
sage of the Bank Secrecy Act50 and subsequent court decisions have up-
held this act. 51 This act requires banks to microfilm all checks written 
against its accounts, retain those records for five years, and to report all 
transactions involving $10,000 or more to the Treasury Department. 52 
45. Contingent fees system was prohibited under the medieval doctrine of Champerty, which 
prohibited a "suit in exchange for the promise of a share of the recovery." F.B. MACKINNON, 
CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 36-38 (1964). 
46. The other countries that permit contingency fees are Spain and certain provinces of 
Canada. See Philip H. Corboy. Contingency Fees: The Individual's Key to the Courthouse Door, 
1976 LITIG. 27, 30 (1975-76). 
47. For a discussion of the erosion of financial privacy, see How to Keep your Personal 
Information Personal: Tips from the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 14 CAL. REG. L. REP. I 
(Winter 1994); Alexander C. Papandreou, KREBS v. Rutgers: The Potential for Disclosure of 
Highly Confidential Personal Information Renders Questionable the use of Social Security 
Numbers as Srudent Identification Numbers, 20 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 79 (Summer 1993). 
48. Eleven years before the Swiss enacted Article 47, which codified the Germanic custom 
of bank secrecy, the English courts recognized that right. See Toumier v. National Provincial and 
Union Bank of England, I K.B. 461 (C.A. 1924). 
49. See id. 
50. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1951-59 (1970). 
51. See Cal. Bankers Assoc. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). 
52. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1951-59 (1970). 
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Most offshore jurisdictions have strong statutory provisions protect-
ing bank secrecy.53 Since bank secrecy no longer exists in the United 
States, a domestic asset protection trust is not a viable option for clients 
who feel they need the extra asset protection that financial privacy can 
provide. 
5. Fee Shifting 
Possibly the greatest disincentive for judgment creditors to pursue 
offshore assets is the rule that the loser must pay all court costs.54 As will 
be discussed later, offshore jurisdictions do not recognize foreign judg-
ments; therefore, if a plaintiff wishes to pursue assets offshore in order to 
satisfy the judgement obtained in the United States, the whole matter 
must be relitigated. Furthermore, in addition to bearing his own cost in 
the relitigation, if the judgment creditor fails to prove actual intent to de-
fraud, then the challenge to the validity of the trust will fail and the credi-
tor will be responsible for all litigation costs incurred by the trust. This 
provision is not in effect in Delaware, but is, to a lesser degree, in 
Alaska. 55 Fee shifting acts as a powerful mace in the hands of a debtor to 
beat his potential creditor into a more favorable settlement. 
6. Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and Recognition of Foreign Judgments 
Perhaps the greatest advantage offshore asset protection trusts have 
over their domestic cousins is that they are located in a separate sovereign 
nation. Because of this fact, the United States must respect the decisions 
of those other countries and cannot hold its laws to be above those of an-
other nation. 56 A client using an offshore jurisdiction as his trust situs will 
be able to place the assets outside the reach of any court in the United 
States. Furthermore, when selecting an offshore trust situs, an attorney 
should advise a client that the greatest level of asset protection is 
53. Bundesetx uber die Banken und Starkassen, Des of Nov. 8, 1934, as amended by 
Federal Law March II, 1971 (Swiss codification of bank secrecy); Cayman Confidential 
Relationships Law (Law 16 of 1976) as amended (Law 26 of 1979) (reprinted in U.S. v. Davis. 
767 F.2d 1025, 1032 n.l4 (2nd Cir. 1985)). 
54. Many have suggested that America adopt the English rule of fee shifting, which is the 
rule in all common law offshore havens. See generally Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa W. Cams, 
Alaska's English Rule: Attorney's Fee Shifting in Civil Cases, 13 ALASKA L. REV. 33 (1996) 
(explaining the effect of fee shifting in Alaska courts). 
55. See ALASKA R. Crv. P. 82 (West 1998). In cases awarding money damages, 20% of the 
first $25,000 and 10% of any additional amount are shifted to the losing party. In contingency fee 
cases 30% of the fee is shifted for cases that go to trial and 20% for those that settle. 
56. See Ellen C. Auwarter, Note, Compelled Waiver of Bank Secrecy in the Caynwn 
Islands: Solution to International Tax Evasion or Threat to Sovereignty of Nations? 9 FORDHAM 
INT'L L. 1. 680 (1985-86) (discussing the sovereignty and conflict of law issues facing offshore 
centers). 
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achieved when the assets are placed in a jurisdiction that does not recog-
nize foreign judgments, such as Nevis or the Cook Islands.57 
Unfortunately, a false sense of security may be promoted when peo-
ple locate their assets in a domestic asset protection trust. The Constitu-
tion requires that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the 
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. "58 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution requires all states to 
forego their sovereignty and to have full comity between the states as to 
their laws and judgments. The requirement of comity could produce an 
adverse result for a domestic asset protection trust, as demonstrated in the 
following example. 
Suppose a North Carolina doctor establishes an Alaska asset protec-
tion trust. Two years later, a judgment is entered against him in North 
Carolina for malpractice that occurred one year after the asset protection 
trust was established. As part of that judgment, the North Carolina court 
determines, according to Alaska law, that the Alaska trust was a fraudu-
lent conveyance, even though, under Alaska law, the conveyance would 
not be deemed fraudulent. This incorrect decision is later upheld by the 
North Carolina Supreme Court. Then the plaintiff files a motion in 
Alaska to have the North Carolina judgment enforced. The Alaska judi-
ciary is left with no choice but to enforce the judgment, even though the 
judgment was based on a mistake of law. The United States Supreme 
Court makes it clear in Fauntleroy v. Lum that "[a] judgment is conclu-
sive ... and it needs no authority to show that it cannot be impeached 
either in or out of the State by showing that it was based on a mistake of 
law."59 As was the case in Fauntleroy, the North Carolina court misinter-
preted the desire of the Alaska legislature, thereby frustrating an impor-
tant social policy of Alaska. Comity requires that the North Carolina 
judgment against the Alaska trust be given full faith and credit in 
Alaska.60 
Such adverse decisions would not be possible in an offshore jurisdic-
tion, because most offshore jurisdictions do not recognize foreign judg-
ments.61 The final judgment proffered in the United States would have to 
be relitigated in the offshore jurisdiction, with the offshore jurisdiction's 
own courts properly applying its own laws. 
57. See Rothschild, supra note 7, at 67 n.8. 
58. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I. 
59. 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908). 
60. See William L. Reynolds, The Iron Law of Full Faith and Credit, 53 Mo. L. REV. 412, 
414 (1994) (providing excellent discussion of the harshness of this rule). 
61. See generally INTERNATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING: PRINCIPLES AND STRATEGIES, 90·96 
(Donald D. Kozusko & Jeffery A. Schoenblum eds. 1991) (discussing non·recognition of foreign 
judgments in several major offshore financial centers). 
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Besides comity among states, the Supremacy Clause62 of the Consti-
tution poses additional obstacles to preventing domestic asset protection 
trusts from being pierced, mostly in bankruptcy court cases. The federal 
bankruptcy courts have nationwide jurisdiction enabling them to reverse 
any conveyance in any United States jurisdiction that is found to be 
fraudulent. 63 Fraudulent conveyances will be discussed in more detail 
later in this comment. Since the bankruptcy courts have nationwide juris-
diction, if a bankruptcy court determines that the trust was a fraudulent 
conveyance under Federal law, it can reverse, for example, an Alaskan 
conveyance, even if the conveyance would not be deemed fraudulent un-
der Alaska law.64 Again, this result would not happen if the trust were 
established in an offshore jurisdiction, because the Supremacy Clause 
would not apply. 
7. Flight Clauses 
The ultimate safeguard for an asset protection trust is a flight clause. 
A flight clause instructs the trustee to remove the trust and its assets to 
another jurisdiction in the event the trust may, in the trustee's sole discre-
tion, be under attack.65 This provision enables a trust to successfully hop 
around the world's scores of financial centers, avoiding detection, 
through bank secrecy, and further isolating the trust from attack. 
At first blush, one might believe that a flight clause would make a 
domestic asset protection trust ideal because the assets could remain in 
the United States and, if the trust comes under attack, it could flee to an-
other, more secure, jurisdiction. This assertion fails on two points. First, 
the assets could be impounded by judicial decree, even before a judgment 
is rendered. A judge may be more willing to order the assets frozen, be-
cause fleeing the United States at exactly the same time a lawsuit is filed 
against the grantor may reek of fraud. Second, even if the assets are ini-
tially removed, because the United States lacks bank secrecy, a removal 
of substantial assets in this manner would leave a paper trail, easily fol-
lowed to the new jurisdiction. In the new offshore jurisdiction, the trust 
may not qualify for protection because the statute of limitations would 
not have run, and again the unwary client would be caught in the fraudu-
lent conveyance net of both countries. Because the purpose of properly 
62. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
63. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1990). 
64. See generally In re Oberst, 91 B.R. 97 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988) (denying the bankruptcy 
discharge because debtor engaged in bankruptcy planning by availing herself of state exempt 
property laws). 
65. See also INTERNATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING: PRINCIPLES AND STRATEGIES, supra note 
62, at 471-76. 
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performed asset protection is to shield assets without the appearance of 
impropriety, domestic flight clauses are often not a viable option and the 
lack of legitimate flight clauses severely handicaps domestic asset protec-
tion trusts. 
B. Statutory Law Considerations: Bankruptcy and Fraudulent 
Conveyance Law 
Having discussed the history and importance of asset protection as 
well as the various procedural considerations relevant to asset protection 
calculus, the next portion of the asset protection equation is statutory. In 
deciding whether domestic or offshore asset protection is best for an indi-
vidual, an attorney must also consider several statutory law differences 
between United States and offshore jurisdictions. The major statutory 
considerations are bankruptcy and fraudulent conveyance laws. 
Bankruptcy planning is one of the reasons people have turned to asset 
protection trusts. This is perhaps the most controversial area of asset pro-
tection, because traditionally, the primary public policy consideration 
against self-settled spendthrift trusts was the desire to prevent people 
from "exploiting" the bankruptcy laws to evade their debts.66 American 
bankruptcy law has always allowed for some bankruptcy planning with 
homestead exemptions and other exempt property. This comment will not 
discuss the ethical or public policy considerations involved in bankruptcy 
planning, but instead will focus on available bankruptcy planning options 
through domestic and offshore asset protection trusts.67 
As previously noted, one of the primary motivations for people taking 
their assets offshore is to place assets in a jurisdiction that has revoked 
the Statute of Elizabeth and does not recognize foreign judgments. Some 
American courts have not accepted the fraudulent conveyance laws of 
other jurisdictions and have attempted to force the debtor to release the 
funds. 68 These assets were not kept in properly drafted trusts. 
Since United States courts cannot make an offshore trustee release 
the funds to the American court, some courts may try to use contempt 
sanctions against the grantor in hopes the grantor, using whatever influ-
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156(1) (1957); In re Oberst, 91 B.R. 97, 99 
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988) (providing that the court must consider the gray area between "bankruptcy 
planning" and "intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor."). 
67. See generally McElhanon v. Hing, 728 P.2d 256 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that 
an attorney can be held liable for participating in a fraudulent conveyance scheme; therefore, it is 
important for attorneys to be extremely careful how they structure asset protection transactions). 
68. See In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996); Philip R. Rupprecht & 
Jonathan P. Friedland, Is There Bankruptcy Protection in an Asset Protection Trust? 14 BANKR. 
STRATEGIST I (July 1997). 
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ence he has over the trustee, will be able to get the assets repatriated.69 A 
well-drafted asset protection trust should make it impossible for a client 
to ever repatriate the assets held in trust.70 The Supreme Court has held 
that impossibility of performance is a complete defense to civil 
contempt/1 as long as the party claiming impossibility did not create the 
impossibility.72 The test applied to this exception is a that there must be a 
"nexus in time between the order in question and the creation of the im-
possibility.'m In other words, to impose contempt sanctions the court will 
have to find a willful attempt to evade the court's order, which should 
never occur with a properly drafted and funded asset protection trust. 
Another technique judges have used to punish persons who fail to 
include offshore assets in their bankruptcy declaration is to deny them 
discharge in bankruptcy.74 These courts feel that bankruptcy discharge is 
a privilege and failure to approach the proceedings with what the court 
perceives as "candor" warrants denial of discharge. 
When using a domestic asset protection trust, perhaps the largest po-
tential pitfall lies in the area of fraudulent conveyances. 75 When one files 
for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee may have the option to apply ei-
ther the federal or state fraudulent conveyance laws and statute of limita-
tions to the bankruptcy estate.76 The trustee will be allowed this choice 
provided that one of the unsecured creditors would have standing to bring 
a state claim,77 which is almost always the case. The trustee will probably 
choose to apply the state law if it is more stringent than the federal law. 
Most states have adopted either the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance 
Act or the Fraudulent Transfer Act.78 Both acts focus on whether the 
transfer was made for "fair consideration"79 or "reasonably equivalent 
69. Besides contempt sanctions, the court could choose to apply 18 U.S.C. § 157 (1997), 
which allows the bankruptcy court to punish debtors who make false or fraudulent representations 
under Title II proceedings with fines and or five years in prison. 
70. See Engel, supra note 15, at 218; David D. Beazer, The Mystique of "Going Offshore," 
9 UTAH B. J. 19, 21 (Dec. 1996). 
71. See. e.g., U.S. v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950); Healy v. U.S., 186 F.2d 164 (9'" Cir. 
1950). 
72. See, e.g., American Fletcher Mortgage Co. v. Bass, 688 F.2d 513 , n.8 (7'" Cir. 1982). 
73. Engel, supra note 15, at 218. See FTC v. Blaine, 308 F.Supp 932 (N.D. Ga. 1970); 
James 0. Ehinger, Pre-litigation Planning in Multinational Cases, 33 ARiz. ATTY. 21 (April 1997). 
74. See In re Colburn, 145 B.R. 851 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992) (denying discharge because 
client understated his assets in the bankruptcy process; client had established a trust and sent its 
assets to the Bank of Bermuda). 
75. This is also the case with offshore trusts. See generally William D. upkind & Elizabeth 
Gasser, On the Road Offshore: The Struggle between Protection of Assets and Fraudulent 
Conveyances, 147 N.J. LAWYER 40 (July/Aug. 1992). 
76. See II U.S.C. § 544(b) (1984). 
77. See id. 
78. See Mayerson et al., supra note 38. 
79. See UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 3 (1918). 
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value."80 Since asset protection trusts are typically created with no legally 
defined "consideration," such a trust would fail the test. As a result, the 
trust assets would be deemed to be owned by the grantor, not by the trust, 
and thereby subject to forfeiture in the bankruptcy proceeding. 
Federal law tends to focus more on the traditional "badges of fraud," 
which allow the judges or trustees to set aside conveyances that they sub-
jectively believe have fraudulent intent. If the trustee believes the transfer 
took place with the actual intent to defraud, then the trustee can set aside 
any such conveyance that occurred within the past three years.81 Other-
wise, the trustee is limited only to setting aside conveyances that occurred 
within one year of filing for bankruptcy .82 As discussed, the court may be 
able to borrow the state's statute of limitations if it increases the length of 
the state's statute of limitations. 
The reason fraudulent conveyances pose more problems for domestic 
asset protection trusts than offshore asset protection trusts is the reach of 
the bankruptcy court. Since bankruptcy courts have national 
jurisdiction,83 they generally find it easier to reach the assets and may be 
more inclined to do so. On the other hand, the court may take into ac-
count several mitigating factors, including the fact that the trust is located 
within the United States, provides no protection against pre-existing cred-
itors,84 and that the trust is governed by a four year statute of limita-
tions. 85 When compared to the short statute of limitations in most off-
shore jurisdictions, these provisions in domestic trusts may seem suffi-
ciently reasonable to an American judge. These factors, as well as the 
court's possible prejudice against offshore trusts, may cause the court to 
view the trust as a legitimate planning tool and not an attempt by the 
debtor to evade his obligations. 
IV. CONSIDERATIONS IN SELECfiNG THE SITUS OF AN ASSET 
PROTECTION TRUST 
A. Availability of Protector 
American courts, as a matter of public policy, require that the trustee 
be able to exercise independent discretion over the trust assets and not be 
influenced by the beneficiary. 86 The rationale for such a policy is to pre-
80. See UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Acr § 4(a)(2) (1918) (ignoring good faith as a 
determination of value). 
81. See II U .S.C. § 548(a)(l) (I 990). 
82. See id. 
83. See II U.S.C. § 548 (1990). 
84. See ALASKA STAT.§ 34.40.110 (Michie 1997). 
85. See id. 
86. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS§ 5 cmt. g (draft April 1996). 
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vent beneficiary self-dealing through the trustee. In contrast, most off-
shore jurisdictions, while maintaining the trustee's authority to exercise 
discretion, do not require the grantor-beneficiary to relinquish all supervi-
sion over the trustee. 87 
The grantor may employ several methods to control the trustee's ac-
tions. The first is a letter stating the grantor's wishes. While the trustee 
has a fiduciary duty to the trust and its assets, he also has a moral obliga-
tion to manage the trust according to the objectives for which the grantor 
established the trust. 
Another method commonly used in offshore trusts to retain some 
grantor control is the establishment of a protector or a committee of pro-
tectors. Protectors are typically non-beneficiaries whose duty it is to in-
sure that the trustee adheres to the grantor's wishes. If the trustee fails to 
perform his duty, then the protectors have the ability to remove the 
trustee and appoint a new one. If a single protector is used, it is common 
for grantors to appoint a relative to this post. Sometimes when a commit-
tee approach is used, the grantor-beneficiary will serve as chairman of the 
committee.88 Both of these approaches give the appearance of self-dealing 
to an American court. 
There is nothing in the Alaska or Delaware trust statutes prohibiting a 
disinterested party from serving as a protector. Unfortunately, the grantor 
probably cannot serve in the protector capacity for a domestic trust. Even 
if the grantor does not serve in this capacity, domestic trusts may face the 
problem of the trust protector being the agent of the grantor-beneficiary. 
Thus, through agency theory, the grantor-beneficiary may have retained a 
general power of appointment over the trust corpus, making the trust re-
vocable and available for attachment by judgment creditors and, as Part V 
will point out, making the trust an uncompleted gift for tax purposes. 
Similarly, if the grantor-beneficiary serves as the protector or as part 
of the committee of protectors, it may be more likely that the trust will be 
viewed as revocable by a court and will face possible attachment under a 
judgment against the grantor-beneficiary. Furthermore, as will be dis-
cussed later, a grantor-beneficiary retaining actual control through serv-
ing on the committee of protectors could block some possible tax benefits 
available to asset protection trusts. 
87. See Howard Rosen, The Protectors-the Role of this Little Known Breed with Particular 
Reference to the Operation of Off-shore Trusts, 90 LAW SOCIETY's GAZETTE 19 (July 14, 1993). 
88. See Rothschild, supra note 7, at 64-65. Both Cook Islands and Belize allow a grantor-
beneficiary to serve as protector. See International Trusts Act 1994 § 13(c) (amended 1989) (Cook 
Is.); Trusts Act, 1992, § 9(2) (1992) (Belize). 
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B. Privacy 
Financial privacy has long been one of the reasons high-net worth 
persons have turned to trusts to settle their estates and control their finan-
cial affairs. Privacy is considered one of the premier protections available 
to asset protection trusts. Offshore jurisdictions provide comprehensive 
statutory bank secrecy laws, which serve to keep clients' financial laun-
dry out of public view.89 
Unfortunately, offshore privacy has come under attack by the United 
States' desire to ensure it is collecting taxes properly due from foreign 
trust income. Changes to the Internal Revenue Code enacted in 1996 re-
move much of the privacy previously available to offshore trusts.90 These 
provisions require taxpayers to report on their Form 1040 any foreign 
trust, account, or entity in which they have an ownership or controlling 
interest.91 The new amendments require that a taxpayer report to the In-
ternal Revenue Service within ninety days of the occurrence of a report-
ing event with these foreign entities.92 Reporting events include the cre-
ation of a foreign trust, transfer of money to a foreign trust, direct or indi-
rect lifetime or testamentary transfer of money to a United States person, 
and the death of the person who was taxed on the trust and the amount of 
tax owed on the offshore estate.93 Only pension and charitable trusts are 
excluded from these requirements.94 These foreign trust reporting require-
ments would not apply to domestic asset protection trusts.95 
Checking the box and complying with the reporting events makes it 
easier for a client's financial privacy to be pierced. A clever plaintiff's 
attorney will ask for a defendant's income tax return in discovery and 
through the return will discover the foreign trust. It is an unsettled area of 
the law whether an asset protection trust is under the "control or owner-
ship" of a client, but the Internal Revenue Service intends for the law to 
include asset protection trusts. A client who chooses not to check the ap-
89. See Bundesetx uber die Banken und Starkassen, Des of Nov. 8, 1934, as amended by 
Federal Law March II, 1971 (Swiss codification of bank secrecy); Cayman Confidential 
Relationships Law (Law 16 of 1976) as amended (Law 26 of 1979) (reprinted in U.S. v. Davis, 
767 F.2d 1025, 1032 n.14 (2nd Cir. 1985). 
90. See Joseph G. Howe lll & Kathleen M. Courtis, The New Regulatory Frontier for 
Foreign Grantor Trusts, 3 J. ASSET PROTECT. 20 (Nov./Dec. 1997); Robert B. Martin, Jr., Small 
Business Act Requires U.S. Agent Appointment by Foreign Trusts, 86 J. lNT'L TAX 172 (March 
1997); Leslie A. Share, Planning Impact of New Expatriation and Foreign Trust Tax Rules, 24 
EST. PLAN. 51 (Feb. 1997). 
91. See I.R.C. § 6048 (1997); I.R.S. Notice 96-60 (Nov. II, 1996); I.R.S. Notice 96-65 
(December 12, 1996); I.R.S. Notice 97-34 1997 I.R.B. 25. 
92. See id. 
93. See id. 
94. See id. at § 6048(b )(ii). 
95. See id. 
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propriate box may be relying on sound principles of international law and 
comity, but such principles will probably fall on deaf ears at the Internal 
Revenue Service. As the United States government continues to expand 
its ability to pry into offshore entities, over time offshore asset protection 
trusts may offer only a slight privacy advantage over their domestic coun-
terparts. 
C. Regulations 
Another important consideration for some individuals in choosing a 
trust situs is regulatory relief. Regulatory relief is typically sought by cor-
porations doing business offshore.96 Highly regulated businesses, espe-
cially banks, were the first businesses to take advantage of the friendlier 
regulatory environment found offshore. Some individuals may find addi-
tional regulatory relief offshore, especially in investment opportunities. 
Domestic trusts provide no escape from the American regulatory state 
because of comity among the states and the Supremacy Clause. Clearly, if 
a client is using an asset protection trust with the objective of obtaining 
some sort of regulatory relief, such relief would be found only in an off-
shore, not a domestic, asset protection trust. 
D. Investment Opportunities 
Because of governmental regulation, an offshore trust may be ideal if 
a client wishes to take advantage of international investment opportuni-
ties not available in the United States. Moreover, domestic asset protec-
tion trusts offer no diversification or other investment opportunities not 
already available to clients. Therefore, if a client wishes to expand the 
value of the trust corpus through an international financial presence, the 
scale of choice would tilt toward an offshore asset protection trust. 
V. TAX CONSEQUENCES OF DIFFERENT TRUST SITUS 
Offshore asset protection trusts are widely considered to be tax neu-
tral.97 This is because, under the foreign grantor trust rules in the Internal 
Revenue Code, the assets contained in a foreign trust remain under the 
ownership of the grantor.98 These foreign grantor trust rules reinforce the 
96. As was explained in the introduction, the offshore industry was initially established to 
provide for financial institutions an environment where they could conduct necessary transactions 
that were prohibited in the countries in which they normally operate. 
97. See Engel, supra note 15, at 216-17; Beazer, supra note 5, at 21. Many offshore 
jurisdictions have no income tax. However, these provisions have no effect on asset protection 
trusts, because of their tax neutral nature. 
98. See I.R.C. §§ 673-77 (1997); Prv. Ur. Rul. 93-32006 (Aug. 13, 1993). This is the only 
ruling on offshore asset protection trusts. The Service held that the trust constituted a completed 
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fact that the United States is the only country in the world that taxes its 
citizens on their worldwide income. The foreign grantor trust rules state 
that any trust created outside the United States continues to be owned by 
the grantor, as long as a United States citizen is a named beneficiary of 
any part of the trust income.99 These rules are the foundation for the be-
lief that offshore trusts are tax neutral. 100 
If one is successful in treating the transfer of assets to an asset protec-
tion trust as a gift to the trust instead of a transfer to another part of the 
estate, the grantor would be subject to gift tax on the transfer, but then the 
trust income would be able to accumulate value free of gift and estate tax. 
This is possible because of the International Grantor Trust ("IGT ") provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code, 101 as well as the fact that gift tax eli-
gibility hinges on creditor access to the gift's corpus. The test commonly 
used by the Internal Revenue Service and the courts to determine whether 
a trust constitutes a completed gift and will be subject to gift tax is 
whether creditors can access the trust's corpus. 102 If the court finds that 
creditors cannot access the assets, then the transfer constitutes a com-
pleted gift for tax purposes, and the settlor would be subject to gift tax. 
On the other hand, if the court deems the creation of the trust not to be a 
completed gift because creditors may still access the trust corpus, then no 
gift tax is due. 
By casting the transfer as a gift to an IGT, the client will also be able 
to escape estate tax liability. Under the IGT rules, the grantor will remain 
the owner of the trust income for tax purposes and no additional gift tax 
will be owed on the accumulated income inside the offshore asset protec-
tion trust. 103 This allows accumulations of income to be taxed at a lower 
income tax rate rather than the gift tax rate. In order to achieve the IGT 
status, a trust must deliberately violate one of the grantor trust rules, 104 
such as violating one or more of the prohibited controls contained in the 
grantor trust rules, 105 or simply making the trust a foreign trust. 106 
gift. since dominion and control were relinquished and gift tax is due. 
99. See l.R.C. § 679 (1997). 
100. See id. at § 1491 (providing that a foreign grantor trust could be subject to a 35% 
excise tax on appreciated property transferred to the foreign trust if the capital gains tax is not paid 
on the property before it is placed in the offshore trust). 
101. See Nelson, supra note 10, at Ill; TREAS. REG. 25.2511-l(d) (1997). 
102. See TREAS. REG. § 25.2518-2(c)(3) (1997); followed in U.S. v. Irvine, 511 U.S. 224 
(1994). 
103. See Nelson, supra note 10. 
I 04. See Nelson, supra note I 0, at 112. 
105. See l.R.C. §§ 673-77 (1997). 
106. See id. at § 679. 
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Both domestic and offshore asset protection trusts violate the grantor 
trust rules simply because the grantor is one of the beneficiaries. 107 Like-
wise, if the Internal Revenue Service determines, as it should, that the 
laws of Delaware and Alaska protect these trusts from creditors, then 
these trusts could qualify as completed gifts under the gift tax rules. The 
effective gift tax rate is lower in the United States than the effective es-
tate tax rate. Therefore, if domestic asset protection trusts qualify, the 
assets inside a domestic asset protection trust will be able to appreciate 
inside the trust, without the donee-the trust-incurring additional gift 
tax liability. 108 Upon the death of the grantor-beneficiary, the remaining 
beneficiaries will enjoy the trust corpus free of estate tax. Because of this 
result, the domestic asset protection trust may provide a decisive advan-
tage for those seeking to use asset protection trusts primarily as an estate 
planning device. Alaskan asset protection trusts have a decisive advan-
tage over their Delaware cousins because Alaska has no income tax. 109 
The Alaska and Delaware trust laws appear to offer sufficient protec-
tion against creditors to enable a client to reduce the estate tax burden 
while retaining a discretionary right to payments from assets one has al-
ready given to the trust. 110 Professor Nelson has previously noted that for 
offshore asset protection trusts "it appears that if the settlor's only contin-
uing involvement with the trust assets is as a beneficiary of a discretion-
ary trust, the transfer could be deemed a complete gift for gift tax pur-
poses."111 Such beneficial tax treatment is now available to Alaska and 
Delaware trusts because creditors cannot access these trusts; therefore, 
the self-settled trust should be considered a completed gift by the Internal 
Revenue Service. 112 Unfortunately, at this point in time such determina-
tions are purely conjecture, since the Internal Revenue Service has given 
practitioners little guidance as to how it will treat offshore asset protec-
tion trusts and no guidance for the tax treatment of domestic asset protec-
tion trusts. These trusts have not existed long enough for the Service to 
appropriately determine its response. Because of the courts' tendency to 
107. See id. at §§ 674, 677. 
108. See Nelson, supra note 10, at 107. 
109. See infra note 114, at 357. 
110. See TREAS. REG 25.2511-2(b) (1997). This regulation states the following: 
For example, if the donor transfers property to another in trust to pay income to the 
donor or accumulate it in the discretion of the trustee, and the donor retains a 
testamentary power to appoint the remainder among his descendants, no portion of the 
transfer is a completed gift. On the other hand, if the donor has not retained a 
testamentary power of appointment, but instead provides that the remainder should go 
to X or his heirs, the entire transfer would be a completed gift. 
Ill. Nelson, supra note 10, at 114. 
112. See Nelson, supra note 10, at 114. 
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rely on local law to determine creditor access, domestic trusts should 
qualify for the favorable estate tax treatment formerly available only to 
offshore asset protection trusts. 
VI. WHEN ARE DOMESTIC ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS RIGHT FOR 
YOUR CLIENT 
For over fifteen years, asset protection trusts have provided a form of 
anti-litigation insurance, making it costly and impractical for potential 
future creditors to attack a client's assets. Now, as a reaction to the litiga-
tion explosion, asset protection has gained more acceptance in the United 
States with Alaska and Delaware blazing the trail. 
Domestic trusts lack some of the key procedural and statutory bene-
fits that provide a strong anti-litigation foundation to the offshore trusts, 
as well as the benefit of being able to retain some indirect supervision 
over the disposition of the trust. What domestic trusts lack in procedural 
safeguards possibly may be recovered through greater investment security 
and through tax incentives formerly only available under the international 
grantor trust rule. Only time will tell if such incentives will sufficiently 
compensate for the lower levels of privacy and security domestic asset 
protection trusts enjoy. 
Furthermore, domestic asset protection trusts may represent the best 
compromise for the hard public policy questions concerning use of self-
settled spendthrift trusts. Because of this compromise, these trusts may be 
found to be more palatable to those judges who are prone to ignore legal 
entities in order to pursue what they consider to be justice. 
The two key questions a practitioner must answer in evaluating 
whether a client should use a domestic asset protection trust are: first, 
whether the client's primary motivation is estate tax planning or asset 
protection, 113 and, second, whether entity piercing judges will ignore do-
mestic asset protection trusts as they have ignored other entities or choice 
of law provisions. 114 The answer to the second question is "yes" and go-
ing offshore still remains the best option for most clients because, despite 
the alleged tax benefits of domestic asset protection trusts, as far as asset 
protection is concerned, domestic trusts are still charlatans. 
Ritchie W. Taylor 
113. If you are more interested in the estate planning aspects of Alaska trust. see Jonathan 
G. Blattmachr et al., New Alaskn Trust Act Provides Many Estate PlanninJ: Opportunities, 24 EST. 
PLAN. 347 (Oct. 1997). 
114. See In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (court ignored choice-of-law 
provision contained in debtor's trust document). 
